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THE VOLUNTARY NONSUIT IN VIRGINIA
The availability of the voluntary nonsuit to the plaintiff and the inequities of its operation against the defendant were amply illustrated in
Berryman v.Moody,' a decision which, while a correct interpretation of
the Virginia nonsuit statute, shows how antiquated the nonsuit has become in this state. Regardless of its merits or demerits, the voluntary
nonsuit can be of immense value to a plaintiff during the course of his
action; however, mainly because of the confusion surrounding this and
other related methods of terminating a suit, the voluntary nonsuit is,
for many lawyers, a somewhat nebulous term. Due to this and other
reasons, the voluntary nonsuit, for better or for worse, is often completely ignored by the plaintiff's lawyer, or else is resorted to only in
desperation. In order to utilize the voluntary nonsuit to its full potentiality and likewise to effectively oppose a voluntary nonsuit, both the
plaintiff's attorney and the defendant's attorney must not only fully
understand the nonsuit in Virginia as compared with other jurisdictions
and with the federal practice, but in what ways it differs from related
methods of terminating a legal proceeding.
THE VOLUNTARY NONsUIT

AND ITS CousINs

The nonsuit, as used in Virginia procedure, is entirely voluntary. In
this state, unlike the practice of other jurisdictions, there is no compulsory or involuntary nonsuit.2 While the court may recommend or
advise the plaintiff to take a nonsuit, it has no means of forcing a nonsuit upon an unwilling plaintiff.'
The practice in Virginia has always been to allow the plaintiff a
nonsuit as a matter of right,4 unless, of course, it would result in a
grievous wrong to the defendant or other interested parties. The
Virginia statute does not modify this basic premise, but states only that
after a certain stage in the proceedings the court shall not allow the
plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit.5 The best summation of the
1. 205 Va. 516, 137 S.El.d 900 (1964).
2. "It is the practice in some of the states to direct the plaintiff to suffer a nonsuit,
where the plaintiff has failed to make out even a prima facie case, or where, if the

verdict were rendered for him, the court would feel compelled to set it aside" BURKSo
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 646 (4th ed., Boyd, 1952). "In England, and in some of these

states, it is a frequent practice to direct the plaintiff to suffer a non-suit whenever the
court thinks the evidence palpably insufficient to maintain the action, and that without
consulting the wishes of the plaintiff. In Virginia . ..no such practice has ever prevailed:' 4 MINOR, 1NsrrTJT' OF COMMON AND STATuTE LAw 867 (2d ed. 1883).
3. Ross v. Gill, IVa. (1 Wash.) 87 (1792).
4. Harrison v. Clemens, 112 Va. 371, 71 S.E. 538 (1911).
5. VA. CoDE ANN. 1950, S 8-220 (REIL. VOL.1957).
[ 357 1

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol 7:357

nature and effect of the voluntary nonsuit in Virginia is that of Professor Minor, who said:
In Virginia all employ the word 'nonsuit' to express any failure on
the part of the plaintiff to prosecute his suit, whether upon being
called at trial or any other time .... The effect of the nonsuit... is
to put an end to the pending suit without prejudicing another for the
same cause of action. The nonsuit is resorted to in our practice when
the plaintiff finds himself unprepared with evidence to maintain his
cause, either in consequence of his being ruled into a trial when he is
not ready or for any other reason.,
The voluntary nonsuit has a number of close relatives which are often
confused with the nonsuit and with each other. While many statements
concerning voluntary nonsuit frequently apply equally well to other
methods of terminating an action, one must remember that each of these
modes of procedure has its own peculiarities and its own functions;
thus, it is the better practice to avoid making any broad generalizations
as to their operation as a group. In general, those terms most often con8
fused with the voluntary nonsuit are the involuntary nonsuit,7 dismissal,
2
0
discontinuance,' nolle prosequi,' non prosequitur," and retraxit.1
6. 4 MINoR, INs-tTUTS OF COMMON AND STATlrv LAW 867 (2d ed. 1883). "The
object and purpose of suffering a nonsuit is to avoid an adverse verdict, for if the
pleadings be correct, and the evidence does not support the allegation of the pleadings,
a verdict would be conclusive against the plaintiff and bar another action for the same
cause. The matter would then be res judicata.' BtURs, PLEADING AND
ed, Boyd, 1952).

PRACtCE

644 (4th

7. Supra note 2.
8. "Dismissal signifies the final ending of a suit, not a final judgment on the controversy, but an end of that proceeding." Hewitt v. International Shoe Co., 110 Fla. 37,
148 So. 533, 536 (1933).
9. "A discontinuance, generally speaking, is a failure to continue the case regularly
from day to day and from term to term the commencement of the suit until final judgment." Bagby v. Kirby, 225 Mo. App. 1190, 35 S.W.2d 54, 56 (1951). See VA. CODE ANN.
1950, § 8-154 (REPL. VoL. 1957).

10. "A nolle prosequi is an acknowledgement or agreement not to prosecute further
in the suit as to a particular person or cause of action.' Supra note 8 at 148 So. 536.
11. "A non prosequitur is a form of dismissal judgment which is entered against a
plaintiff by reason of his failure to continue his suit from time to time as he ought." Ibid.
12. "A retraxit is an open and voluntary renunciation of a claim in court; a formal
and final renunciation of the plaintiff's right of action, operating as a perpetual bar
thereto' Ibid. A retraxit "differs from a nonsuit in that .. . [the latter] is negative
and . . . [the former] is positive.' Hoover v. Mitchell, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 387, 390

(1874).
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FRoM AwTIQuITY

To § 8-220

The voluntary nonsuit in Virginia, being a creature of case precedent
as well as statutory command, stems from the common law and to a
certain extent relies upon that background for its basic precepts. To
fully understand the nonsuit as it exists and functions in Virginia
today, it is desirable to briefly examine its early beginnings and development.
Under the common law, the plaintiff was nonsuited upon his nonappearance in court when his presence was required. This was the result of a rule which required the presence of the plaintiff or his counsel
before a verdict could be given. It was therefore the usual practice for
the plaintiff to deliberately absent himself from the proceedings whenever he had any indication that the case was going against him." The
plaintiff would forthwith be nonsuited and thus be free to bring another
suit on the same cause of action at a more convenient time. This practice,
to the delight of all plaintiffs, developed in such a manner that whenever
the plaintiff chose, for one reason or another, not to risk an adverse verdict, he was allowed to suffer a voluntary nonsuit even though he was
actually present in court.14
The injustices done to the defendant by this early rule gave rise to
modifying acts of Parliament;'" and, upon the importation of the common law to America, the rule was further refined by decisions, court
rules, and statutes. After its emergence from this remodeling phase, the
rule still stated that the right of the plaintiff to suffer a nonsuit was
"absolute"; however, this right did not exist at all times and in all circumstances. The right to the voluntary termination of an action now
depended upon the effect it would have upon the rights of the defendant and/or other interested parties.' The general rule stated that
no nonsuit should be granted if it would place the defendant at an unjust
disadvantage or burden him with oppressive expenses. However, "it is
said that the mere possibility that the defendant might be harassed by
another litigation directed to the same object is not enough to disentitle
the plaintiff to dismiss, [since] the ordinary inconvenience of double
13. ScoTr & SIMPSON,

CIVIL PROCEDuRE

618 (1951).

14. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co, 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
15. E.g., 2 HEN. IV, c. 7.
16. Rozen v. Goattan, 369 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. App. 1963); Gulledge v. Young, 130
S.E.2d 695 (S.C. 1963); In Frear v. Lewis, 201 App. Div. 660, 195 N.Y.S. 3 (1922), it

was held that the right of a plaintiff to voluntarily terminate the suit could not be
used as a guise to cheat an attorney out of his compensation.
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litigation is not legal prejudice, and can be compensated by costs." 17
In short, while the right to a voluntary nonsuit was technically no
longer an "absolute" right, it was still a very powerful weapon on the
side of the plaintiff.
In the majority of jurisdictions today, a plaintiff will generally not be
granted a nonsuit after his case reached the appellate level. Also, where
the appellate court remands the case to a lower court for proceedings in
accordance with its opinion, the plaintiff will not be permitted a nonsuit in the lower court. Where, however, an action is to be heard
de novo by the appellate court, the plaintiff is generally allowed a
voluntary nonsuit on the appellate level if he otherwise proceeds properly. The following illustrative example shows how this may occur:
In a detinue action.. . , judgment was given for the plaintiff and
defendant appealed to the circuit court. During the county court
trial it became apparant that this would have been a proper case [in
which] to have sought punitive damages. Such damages however do
not ordinarily lie in a detinue case. On appeal, counsel for plaintiff
wishes to take a voluntary nonsuit in the circuit court followed by a
motion for judgment for conversion . . . .asking damages for . ..
value plus punitive damages .... The question arises whether the
former adjudication is a bar to non-suit on appeal-the answer should
clearly be No. Since the trial de novo effect of such an appeal is
to abrogate the lower court judgment, a non-suit may be taken on
18
appeal ....
Virginia, too, recognizes that an exception exists when the appellate

court hears the case de novo. In Gemmell v. Svea Fire & Life Ins. Co., 9
the defendant had transmitted a check to the plaintiff company. The
check was not paid owing to the closing of the drawee bank. Upon
hearing in a civil justice court, judgment was given for the defendant.
The case was appealed to the Law and Equity Court of Richmond and
the plaintiff was therein granted a voluntary nonsuit. Thereafter plaintiff again brought suit in the same court and the defendant pleaded res
adjudicata. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the nonsuit should
not have been granted, but since no exception was taken, the objection
of the defendant now came too late. In examining the question of non17. 17 AM. JuR. 105 (1957); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co., 171 US.
138, 146 (1898).

18. Maxson, Some Problems of Removal and Appeal from Courts Not of Record in
Virginia,2 W. & M. L. REv. 40,48 (1959).
19. 166 Va. 95, 184 S.E., 457 (1936).
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suit at the appellate leel, the court said: "A court which hears a case
de novo, which disregards the judgment of the court below, which
hears evidence anew and new evidence, and which makes final disposition of the case, acts not as a court of appeals but as one exercising original jurisdiction." 20
It was established very early in Ross v. Gill2 1 that the nonsuit was
completely voluntary in Virginia and that the court ".

.

. had no

power to direct a nonsuit, however destitute the plaintiff might be of a
right to recover. They may advise it, and may direct the plaintiff to
be called; but if he refuse to suffer a nonsuit, the court can no otherwise
protect and enforce their opinion....2 "The privilege of a voluntary [nonsuit] . .

.

, without prejudice, is absolute and, unlike the

federal system, is not within the discretion of the court." 23
The granting of a voluntary nonsuit to the plaintiff is not a decision
on the merits; thus, it does not prevent the plaintiff from bringing a new
action against the same defendant. 24 In examining the effect of a voluntary nonsuit, the court in Cahoon v. McCulloCh,25 stated that ". . suffering a nonsuit does not bar a right of recovery upon a cause of action
then existing. It has not the effect of merging the cause of action or
preventing a new action against, the same party. The only effect is to
put an end to the pending suit, without precluding another [suit] for
the same cause of action." 26
Under the common law, and among the statutes, there is a divergence
of opinion as to the right of the plaintiff to take a nonsuit after the defendant has interposed a counterclaim. The three main views on this
subject are as follows: (1) the plaintiff may take a voluntary nonsuit
and end the entire action, including the defendant's counterclaim; (2)
plaintiff may suffer a nonsuit as to his own cause of action but the
counterclaim is unaffected and will continue as a separate cause of
action; and, (3) the plaintiff is not permitted a nonsuit after the defendant has filed his counterclaim.27 Virginia has chosen the third view
20. Id. 166 Va. at 98.
21. 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 87 (1792).
22. Id. at 89.
23. Rivers v. Norfolk, Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc, 210 F. Supp. 283, 284 (ED.
Va. 1962).
24. Mallory v. Taylor, 90 Va. 348, 18 S.E. 438 (1893).
25. 92 Va. 177, 23 S.E. 225 (1895).
26. Id. 92 Va. at 180.
27. Scott & SiMPsoN, CVI PRocEmuRE 618 (1951). Moore v. Young, 139 S.E.2d 704
(N.C. 1965) held that a plaintiff who had agreed that compromise of his claim should
be without prejudice to the defendant's counterclaim and who had taken a voluntary
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and has commanded, by statute, that ". . the plaintiff shall not, after
the counterclaim is filed, dismiss his case without the defendant's con-

sent." 2

There is also a conflict of authority as to whether a hearing of the
issues raised by a demurrer has the effect of precluding the plaintiff
from taking a nonsuit. Some jurisdictions have allowed the nonsuit
under such circumstances, 2 while others have not. ° Virginia, by statute,
provides that ".... the court shall allow the demurree to withdraw his
joinder in such demurrer and introduce new evidence, or suffer a nonsuit, at any time before the jury retire from the bar."
THE STATUrE

Although the right of the plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit is
derived from the common law and is not statutory, the Virginia
statute does put certain limitations or conditions upon the exercise of
that right. This statutory fixing of a stage in the proceedings beyond
which the plaintiff is precluded from suffering a nonsuit had a very
early beginning in Virginia. In the Code of 1802 it was stipulated that
"every person desirous of suffering a non-suit on trial, shall be barred
therefrom unless he do so before the jury retire from the bar." Until 1954, § 8-220 of the Virginia Code restricted the plaintiff's
right only to the extent that he was precluded from taking a voluntary
nonsuit after the jury had retired to consider their verdict."3 In cases
where the court sat-without a jury, it was established by the case precedent that the plaintiff was not to be permitted a nonsuit after the case
was submitted to the decision of the court.8 4 In 1954, § 8-220 was
amended and its present form now reads:
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit unless he do so before the jury retire from the bar or before the suit or action has been
nonsuit as to his cause of action was not entitled to reinstate his complaint for the
purpose of going forward with the evidence or of showing that he had first instituted
the suit.
28. VA. CoDn ANN. 1950, § 8-244 (REPL. VoL. 1957).
In Virginia, the defendant is allowed to take a nonsuit on any counterclaim that he
may have instituted. PRELPs, VnimNA RuLEs OF PaocEaDUE IN AcnoNs AT LAW 200
Id. at 204.
(1959). Likewise, a nonsuit may be taken on a cross-claim.
29. E.g., Elliott v. Collins, 6 Idaho 266, 55 P. 301 (1898).
30. Eg., Day v. Mountin, 89 Minn. 297, 94 N.W. 887 (1903).
VoL. 1957).
31. VA. CODE ANN. 1950, § 8-140 (Ri.
32. VA. Rav. CoDE 1802, c. 76, S 33.

33.

VA. CoDm, 1919, § 6256.

34. Norfolk v. Norfolk County, 194 Va. 716, 75 S.E.2d 66 (1953); Harrison v. Clemens,
112 Va. 371, 71 S.E. 538 (1911).
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submitted to the court for decision or before a motion to strike the
evidence has been sustained by the court. And after a nonsuit no new
proceeding on the same cause of action shall be had in any court other
than that in which the nonsuit was taken, unless that court is without
jurisdiction, or not a proper venue, or other good cause be shown for
proceeding in another court.35
The last sentence of the present statute was under consideration in
Rosenbloom v.St. Paul Fire& Marine Ins. Cos' In that case, the plaintiff had previously brought an action against the defendant in the
Virginia courts and had been granted a nonsuit. In this federal proceeding, the defendant argued that the Federal District Court was without jurisdiction because the Virginia statute commands that after the
granting of a nonsuit ".

.

. no new proceeding on the same cause of

action shall be had in any court. other than that in which the nonsuit
was taken. ." 7 The court, in striking down the defendant's contention, said: "The Virginia statute is procedural only. It applies only
to actions in Virginia courts. It does not affect plaintiff's substantive
rights. Therefore it cannot affect the jurisdiction of the federal courts
and does not prevent an action in a federal court after a nonsuit in a
Virginia court." 3s
STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING

Under the early common law, the plaintiff might be granted a voluntary non-suit either before or after the rendering of the verdict by the
jury.3 9 When the proceeding took place before the court without a jury,
the plaintiff was allowed to suffer nonsuit at any time prior to the announcement of the court's decision.4 In 1400 the statute of 2 Henry IV
declared that once the verdict was rendered against the plaintiff he could
not thereafter be voluntarily nonsuited. 41 Under the common law as it
existed after this statute, and as subsequently adopted in this country,
35. VA. CODE ANN. 1950, S 8-220 (REPL. Vor. 1957). The italicized portion was the
result of the 1954 Amendment, Acrs 1954, c. 333, p. 417.
36. 214 F. Supp. 301 (SD.N.Y. 1963).

37. Supra note 35.
38. Supra note 36 at 304. "The effect of the statute is merely to limit the venue of
any new action brought on the same cause of action which has been nonsuited; and
of course, a state venue statute can have no application to the courts of the United
States:' Popp v. Archbell, 203 F.2d 287, 288 (4th Cir. 1953).
39. Wilkes v. Gernon, Y.B. Pasch, 48 Edw. 3, 30 (1371).
40. Robinson v. Lawrence, 7 Exch. 380, 155 Eng. Rep. 995 (1852).
41. 2 HaN. IV, c. 7. But the court still had within its discretion the power to grant
a nonsuit after the finding of a special verdict. Oxford v. Waterhouse, Cro. Car. 575, 79
Eng. Rep. 1095 (1641).
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the plaintiff had an absolute right to take a nonsuit at any time before
the jury rendered its verdict2 or the court announced its decision.4
Today, in the great majority of American jurisdictions, the question of
the proper stage of the proceeding at which voluntary termination may
be had is now governed, completely, or in part, by statute or court
rule.
It is to be noted that the Virginia statute also precludes the granting
of a voluntary nonsuit after the defendant's motion to strike the evidence has been sustained by the court.4 This particular portion of
§ 8-220 was fully explained by the court in Berryman v. Moody. 5 In
the lower court, the defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's evidence was
being argued and the court made certain remarks which gave plaintiff
the impression that the motion would be sustained. Thereupon, the
plaintiff's counsel moved to nonsuit, but the court held that plaintiff's
motion came too late. On appeal, it was held that under § 8-220 the
plaintiff was entitled to take a nonsuit at any time before the motion
to strike had actually been sustained and that the lower court, in the
instant case, had not actually sustained defendant's motion but at most
had only indicated how it might rule. The court noted that ". .. a
ruling is not accomplished by words which lend themselves only to
an inference. The inference may be warranted but the question remains
open -nd the ruling may eventually be contrary to the inference." 46
Along this same line, and cited in the Berryman opinion, is Texas
Van Lines, Inc. v. Templeton. 7 In this Texas decision, it was held
that even where the lower court had stated it was inclined to feel that
defendant's motion for a directed verdict was well taken, this did not
prevent the plaintiff from suffering a voluntary nonsuit. "The fact that
the court has indicated how he will probably decide a case does not
42. O'Mealey v. Wilson, 1 Campb. 482, 172 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1808); Keat v. Barker, 5
Mod. 208, 87 Eng. Rep. 612 (1696).
In some states the plaintiffs right to a nonsuit ends when the jury retires to consider its verdict. Williams v. Whitfield, 163 S.2d 688 (Miss. 1964). In other states the
court has discretion to grant a nonsuit even after the jury has retired, but before
it has rendered its verdict. Albert v. Albert, 377 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Cir. App.). Virginia has chosen the former view.
43. Jenkins v. Faulkner, 174 Va. 43, 4 S.E.2d 788 (1939); Harrison v. Clemens, supra
note 34.
As to the allowance of nonsuit after submission of the case to a referee, arbitrators,
or similar officers, see 17 AM. JuR., Dismissal, Discontinuance,and Nonsuit S 23 (1957).
44. Supra note 35.
45. 205 Va. 516, 137 S.E.2d 900 (1964).
46. Id. at 137 S.E. 2d 902.
47. 305 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Cir. App. 1957).
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preclude a plaintiff from taking a nonsuit." 4 8
EQUITY
Under the early equity practice in England, it was the general rule
that the plaintiff could dismiss his bill as a matter of course at any time
before decree, unless such dismissal would prejudice the rights of the
defendant or interested third parties.4 9
In American courts, the rule has varied greatly from state to state in
the absence of any controlling statute5 0 Some jurisdictions hold that the
allowance of voluntary nonsuits is restricted to actions at law and have
no place in equity except where expressly authorized by statute.5 ' In
other jurisdictions, the question is held to rest entirely in the discretion
of the court. Under this rule, it is generally a matter of course to
allow dismissal before the rendering of the decree5 2 In still other
jurisdictions, it is held to be the undisputed right of the plaintiff to
dismiss his bill at any time before final decree.0
In Virginia, voluntary termination of the proceedings is permitted in
chancery. By § 8-122.1 of the Virginia Code, it is provided that where
a motion is made to strike the evidence in an equity proceeding "the
procedure shall be the same and shall have the same effect as the motion
to strike the evidence in an action at law." 5 Thus, by this statute, the
nonsuit provisions of § 8-220 are made applicable to certain chancery
proceedings.
In this state, the plaintiff may not dismiss his bill after a counterclaim
made
or after the filing of a cross-bill.5 Neither is the plaintiff allowed
is
to voluntarily terminate the proceedings in equity where he is acting in a
fiduciary capacity 8 or where the proceedings involve the administration
of a trust estate.57
48. Id. at 650. It was held in Phipps v. Carmichael, 376 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Cir. App.
1963) that plaintiff was entitled to take a nonsuit where the court had stated it believed
that there was no case for the jury but had not actually announced its ruling.
49. Carrington v. Holly, 1 Dick. 280, 21 Eng. Rep. 276 (1775).
50. See generally Armor, 89 AL.R. 13 (1934); Anno, 126 AL.R. 284 (1940).
51. Case v. Case, 134 S.E2d 394 (S.C. 1964).
52. E.g., Ogens v. Northern Industrial Chemical Co, 304 Mass. 401, 24 N.E2d 1
(1937).
53. E.g., Re Skinner & E. Corp, 265 U.S. 86, 44 S. Cr. 446, 68 L. Ed. 912 (1924).
54. VA. CODE ANN. 1950, § 8-122.1 (REPL. VOL. 1957); see PHELPS, VMGINIA RUI.ES oF
EQury PRAc cE

AND

PROCEDRE 96 (1961).

55. Supra note 28.
56. Patterson v. Old Dominion Trust Co, 136 Va. 246, 123 S.E. 549 (1924).
57. Commonwealth v. Staunton Mur. Tel. Co, 134 Va. 219, 114 S.E. 600 (1922).
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THE FEDERAL APPROACH

Not only are law and equity merged under the federal practice, but
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have also combined the various
methods by which a plaintiff may voluntarily terminate his action. This
single rule, 41 (a) (1), " does not give the plaintiff a right to a voluntary
nonsuit as such, but provides for the voluntary termination of litigation by a motion for dismissal. Under this rule, the plaintiff is permitted
to dismiss his action without prejudice at any time before the defendant
serves his answer or makes a motion for summary judgment. After
either of these two occurences, plaintiff may obtain a dismissal only if he
files a notice of dismissal signed by all the parties to the litigation. Rule
41 (a) (1) is commonly known as the "two-dismissal rule" since it provides that a "....

dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits

when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the
United States or of any state an action based on or including the same
claim." 59
The effect of Rule 41(a) (1) is to safeguard the rights of the defendant and other parties involved in the litigation by restricting the
plaintiff's use of voluntary dismissal to the early stages of the proceeding.
Although the federal courts usually follow the literal wording of the
rule, they consider it flexible enough to allow implementation in such a
way as to prevent any injustices that may arise during the course of
the litigation." In short, this single rule gives the federal courts much
more flexibility in protecting rights and defending against injustices
than do the outmoded and overly-complicated rules and statutes of
many of the states.
CONCLUSION

The federal rule, 41 (a) (1), by virtue of its simplicity and flexibility,
offers far more protection to the defendant than does § 8-220 and related provisions of the Virginia Code. While the Virginia provisions
for voluntary nonsuit are more desirable than those of some other
jurisdictions, these rules are still cumbersome when compared to 41-

(a)(1). Under § 8-220 the plaintiff may, up to certain late stages,
elect to take a nonsuit at any time he thinks his case is going badly.
And even though this may not affect the substantive rights of the de58. FED. R. Cirv. P. 41(a) (1).
59. Ibid.

60. E.g., Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1953).
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fendant, it cannot be denied that such a practice frequently results in
loss of time and money to the defendant, plus the vexing imposition
of prolonged litigation. With the new methods of discovery now available to a plaintiff and in face of the success of Rule 41(a) (1), there
seems little advantage in maintaining a system which permits the person
initiating the action-to withdraw so easily after he has presented his
case. Although procedure is a necessary aspect of any legal system, procedure should be fitted to modem needs and circumstances. The retention of a basically ancient system, whose only real result today is to
prolong litigation, necessarily leads to needless decisions, based upon mere
technicalities of procedure.61 A single dismissal statute, such as Rule
41(a) (1), while protecting the rights of all the parties to the action,
leads to just decisions, arrived at within a framework of modem procedure and practice.
JamesL. Tucker

61. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cole, 156 Va. 707, 713, 158 S.E. 873 (1931), though
speaking specifically of limiting new proceedings to the court in which the nonsuit
was taken, the court reveals the injust results that can accrue from a liberal allowance
of voluntary nonsuit: "Though outside of this record, we may remark in passing that
by many it has long been considered a great public evil that litigants can prosecute
their cases to the point when they are met with [the probability] of an advers6 ruling
...and thereupon can in that action take a nonsuit and thereafter institute another
action and litigate the same questions again.... That litigation can be so prolonged
...[as to impose] an undue hardship upon one of the litigants is apparent.... A
plaintiff who has fairly lost his case once.., should be limited to his appeal ....
and
should not be permitted to reopen the case. .. "
In Clack v. Arthur's Eng'r, Ltd, [1959] 2 W.L.R. 916, the court, in suggesting that
the nonsuit be abolished in the English county courts, stated that although the nonsuit
had been a suitable procedure in the past, "we find it difficult to appreciate what object
is served by preserving in the county court today the old common law remedy of
non-suit, which we venture to think few practitioners of today fully understand." See
75 L.Q. REv. 437 (1959).

